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Name: Doha S. Mostafa 
Course: 558 (Dr Sheila Carapico) 
23th May, 2011. 
Arab Spring Uprisings: Revolutionary Patterns and Theoretical Explanations 
The paper briefly highlights theoretical explanations of concurrent Arab uprisings 
through a literature review on the writings of democratization, authoritarianism in the Middle 
East and third generation insights on the causes of revolutions. Theoretical explanations are 
supported with empirical evidences from State Fragility, and Transformation Index on the 
democracy status of eight Arab countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Yemen, 
and Algeria. The paper seeks to illustrate differences of revolutionary patterns among those 
countries, how this can be theoretically explained, and how concurrent upheavals would draw a 
new political map for the region. Through theoretical discussion to Arab uprisings, and available 
empirical evidences the paper argues that revolutionary situation is more likely to emerge due to 
level of elite’s solidarity, autonomy of armed forces, national unity and geopolitics of the 
region compared with other factors like coercion, and economic, and political structure of the 
state. 
Arab Uprisings: an attempt to new theoretical framework 
Literature on democratization and authoritarianism in the Arab world remains for the last 
two decades uncertain about the future of the region. Recent popular uprisings in many Arab 
countries, mainly Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to an 
extent, increase this level of uncertainly, though open the way for more optimistic expectations. 
Most studies that address the phenomenon of authoritarianism in the Arab world are skeptical 
about the possibility of witnessing strong popular uprisings and revolutions.  Eva Bellin who 
refers briefly to the work of Theda Skocpol’s on revolution concludes: “successful revolutions 
are relatively rare event”, because of the monopoly of the state over means of coercion (Bellin: 
2004). Literature has been characterized by either a pessimistic or skeptical voice for real 
democratic transition1
                                                             
1 Many scholars like Posusney, Assef Bayet, and El Mahdi are optimistic about the future of the 
region on the long run. Posusney, in her article entitled Multiparty Elections in the Arab World: 
Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies, gives a strong attention to the role played 
by agencies, mainly opposition groups, in contested election, and how this can open more 
political opportunities ( Posusney: 2002). She also appreciates the role of moderate Islamists and 
secular groups in shaping the agenda of the coming stage (Posusney: 2002).  Assef Bayet has a 
faith on how ordinary people or leaderless movements can change politics. He has interesting 
insights on new forms of political dynamics taken by ordinary people. His approach is a more 
bottom up on (Gause: 2011). Rabab el Mahdi also seems to be optimistic in regard to pressures 
imposed by new non state actors in Egypt like Kefaya and 6th of April movements (El Madhi: 
2009). Larry Diamond also, in his article that has the title of Why Are There No Arab 
. The nature of current uprisings opens the door for revisiting Arab 
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democratization’s literature and theories with more questions about the future and possibilities 
for consolidated democracy. It should be noticed that none of these scholarly work is seeking for 
a theory of revolution or radical change in the region. They are more likely focused in analysis 
and narrowed to certain variables and not others. Regarding theories of revolution, I shall here 
refer to the work of Goldstone in Theories of Revolution: the Third Generation.  But before 
starting this task two remarks should be taken into consideration: 
Firstly: despite diverse commonalities between Arab states’ authoritative patterns, it 
would be difficult to develop one comprehensive theory in explaining current changes. 
Anderson’s article about the state in the ME and North Africa addresses differences between 
Arab states’ history of state formation and how this affects the state capacity and legitimacy in 
present. Nonetheless, her special focus on institutional and administrative dimensions of state, 
Anderson did not ignore the role of the military and other political institutions (Anderson: 1987). 
The work of Anderson on statehood in the Arab world is a way to contextualize current uprising 
with shared similarities and contextual differences. The same idea is also emphasized by An 
Na’m in analyzing the context of human rights in the Arab world. He stresses differences 
between Arab countries in regard to understanding of Islam, culture, ethnic diversity, political, 
and institutional arrangements ( An Na’m: 2001). The Arab Human Development Report also 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Democracy?, concludes authoritarianism is not the only fate of the region; certain elements can 
lead to change. For him, these elements can be a sharp decline in oil prices, the emergence of a 
democratic role model in the region, and US pressures for democracy. It should be noted that 
Diamond like others does not refer to revolutions or popular uprisings.  On the other hand, 
Albrecht, and Schlumberger, in Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without Democratization in 
the Middle East, persuasively draw the main strategies used by incumbent elites to remain in 
power. These strategies can be summarized as follows:  elite change either through rotation or 
maintenance of the old guard with new faces, Institutional building representing in introducing 
new rules, procedures and allowing for limited competition,  and Changing patterns of 
cooptation through widening clientelism networks (Albrecht and Schlumberger: 2004). Stephen 
King, in his article that has the title of Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North 
Africa, explicitly emphasize the continuity of authoritarianism, with some liberal changes (King: 
2007). Ellen lust from the same perspective develops the concept of competitive clientelism to 
explain how elections are used to distribute resources among supporters and broaden their 
patronage networks (Lust: 2009). The same stance is emphasized again by Lust in her article 
with Amany Jamal on regime type and electoral law formation. Both authors conclude that Arab 
countries witnessed political liberalization but the regime is not yet losing control over the 
process (Lust, and Jamal: 2002).  Lust and Jamal explain how electoral rules are designed 
differently according to regime type, mainly monarchies and one dominant system, to keep the 
power of rulers (Lust, and Jamal: 2002). Furthermore, incumbent elites use all different tactics to 
deal with opposition: physical repression, control over state economy and media, unfair electoral 
rules, and patronage relations (Lust, and Jamal: 2002, Lust: 2009). Abdullah An Na’im in his 
analysis for human rights dependency in the Arab world is also realistic in his expectations for 
the region. He focuses on tactics to make the second half of  freedoms’ cup more full rather than 
being dreamer of a full one (An Na’m: 2001).  
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acknowledges differences among Arab countries,  though it focuses on common problems that 
Arab states share in regard to human security and citizenship (AHDR: 2009). Despite these 
various contexts, scholarly work on the Arab world still able to draw a number of shared 
explanatory variables.  

























-The Arab oil, and western economic 
interests.  
-Peace with Israel. 
-Avoiding extremist Islamist groups 
-Spreading western Variables 
See :  Albrecht and Schlumberger: 
2004, Kausch: 2010, Anderson: 2001. 




-The will and capacity of state apparatus to suppress opposition. 
-Control over media, and state economic resources. 
-Minimizing the military autonomy. 
-Weak political parties, lack of organizational strength, popular 
base, undemocratic practices within parties. 
-State legal and security restrictions over associational life and 
civic participation. 
-Designing electoral and party laws to ensure sustainability of the 
regime. 
-Widening regime’s patronage networks (competitive 
clientelism). 
-An engineered succession. 
-Islamic traditions (this cultural approach has been criticized for 
its orientalist Eurocentric base), fear of extremist Islamist control. 
See: Albrecht and Schlumberger: 2004, Carapico: 1998, 
Anderson: 2001, Lust-Okar and Jamal: 2002, Bellin: 2004, 
Albrecht and Schlumberger: 2004, Albrecht: 2008, Posusney: 
2002, King: 2007. 
 
-Contested elections. 
-The role of human agency 
(mainly some active and 
organized groups like 
Islamists, new political 
actors, civil society 
organizations). 
-Sharp decline in Oil prices. 
-International pressures. 




 Missing factors 
 
Popular uprisings and 
revolutions!!! 
Enduring Authoritarianism 




Secondly: scholars are still unsure if what we witness in many Arab countries is a real 
revolution or not. Most writings and news papers’ releases describe current escalation as popular 
uprisings. Assef Bayet has another concept to describe the case. He calls new changes in Tunisia 
and Egypt a Refolution rather than a Revolution. By the former he means changes are taken place 
within the old incumbent institutions, without institutional radical change, and still fears from a 
counter movement in the horizon (Bayet: 2011)2
These remarks are helpful in assessing literature on revolution. Goldston classifies 
scholarly work on revolution into three generations. The first is from 1900 to 1940 characterized 
by the lack of solid theoretical explanations and more focus on psychological factors. The second 
generation, continued from 1940s till the Iranian revolution, dominated mainly by modernization 
theories. The second generation focused on cognitive psychology and frustration aggression, 
structural functionalist theory, and equilibrium of the system. The second generation had many 
limitations including focusing on vague causes that exist in many contexts and not necessarily 
resulting in a revolutionary outcomes. It also elided a set of important variables that opened the 
way for new theoretical framework of analysis. The third generation paid attention to those 
variables: the goals and structure of the state. Different structures, goals, and programs applied 
by the state affect revolutionary outcomes. The contradiction between state’s goals and society 
would result in a revolution.  Eisenstadt asserts that revolution happens in feudal imperial society 
when the state is not only making use of society resources but also change its value and symbolic 
system. This can be applied to the Arab countries where incompatibility between regime’s 
interest and people exist. Symbolic and value changes in not only limited to imperial cases as 
Eisenstadt concluded but also a core dimension of authoritarianism. Apathetic citizens are a 
reflection for this soft character of despotism
. 
3
                                                             
2 Another skeptical voice for the democratic future of the region is expressed by David Arson in 
one of RAND reports entitled “Is the Arab World Changing for the Better?  
, and some Arab systems, like Tunisia, managed to 
impose more liberal policies on its people. International political and economic pressures would 
result in revolution through imposing capitalist systems, and increasing military competition that 
would put the state in confrontation with the society. The coherence and structure of the military 
is another crucial variable for revolution. The structure of peasantry and its autonomy would also 
push for revolution. Finally, elite’s behavior would determine revolutionary outcomes. More 
open revolutionary elite’s collation would create more open societies compared with 
marginalized closed elites that tend to use coercion. I shall here focus deeply on some of the 
contributions of the third generation and mainly the work of Eric Wolf, and Eisenstadt. Wolf 
Revolutions are usually used to describe qualitative radical change, but these changes would not 
necessarily produce better results. Revolutions themselves can be a way to establish an 
authoritative rule, rather than a democratic one. 




stresses the role of capitalism in provoking revolutionary trends. Eisenstadt on the other hand 
provides a more comprehensive approach that focuses on the level of centrality of the state, 
coherence inside the state, fiscal and military international pressures, and cultural orientations. 
For the cultural orientations part Eisenstadt concludes that certain cultural attitudes should 
emerge in the society to support political, economic, and cultural transformations. These 
orientations emerge through tensions between transcendental and worldly belief systems inside 
the society.  One of the main problems of the third generation is its failure in identifying the 
difference between social transformation and revolution4
Third generation’s main variables found their way in the work of Richard Snyder about 
transitions from neopatrimonial dictatorships. Though Snyder does not consider revolution the 
only fate of neopatrimonialism, it is still an option among others. Revolutionary outcomes, 
according to Snyder, depend on a number of variables: Ruler- Military relations refers mainly to 
the level of armed forces’ autonomy and state control over it. Ruler- Elite relations include 
the level of exclusion of certain elites, and the capacity and organizational strength of opposition. 
Foreign powers influences on maintaining the regime or toppling it, which mainly depends on 
finding another acceptable alternative (Snyder: 1992).  Based on the contributions of the third 
generation and the work of Snyder, I shall provide a theoretical approach to understand Arab 
current popular uprisings. This approach is summarized as follows:  













                                                             
4 This is the same problem which the second remark highlights in the Arab context.  
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5 This is figure is based on the work of Goldeston for Eisenstadt’s analysis of revolution with 
new modifications.  
Revolutionary outcome 










between worldly and 
transcendental visions). 






















Different Arab revolutionary patterns: preconditions, obstacles, and prospects 
So, how this broad theoretical framework can help in understanding why uprisings 
erupted in some Arab countries and not in the rest? What are the missing elements? Why only 
two of them are partially successful, whilst others have been suppressed or still in the start of 
their revolutionary way? The paper focuses on Tunisia and Egypt as two successful cases, Libya 
and Syria as models of continuing brutally suppression, Yemen as continuous struggle, Bahrain a 
case of successful suppression, Jordan a peaceful management, and Algeria a model that did not 
witness any revolts. Due to space limitations, I shall summarize differences among these 








                                                             
6 Key elements of the Table: Main characteristics of uprisings, available prequalifies that would 
lead to revolutionary situation or revolution based on figure 2, lacked preconditions for either 
revolution or a radical change, reasons for the continuity of the regime or retraining its old 
characteristics as in the Tunisian and Egyptian case, reasons for its break down, obstacles for real 
democracy, and added asset for more open system.  
The content of the table and the following analysis is based on a number of recently short 
published articles including: Graham Usher "The Reawakening of Nahda in Tunisia”, Mona El-
Ghobashy “The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution,” Nir Rosen “How it Started in Yemen: From 
Tahrir to Taghyir”, Asef Bayat “The Paradoxes of Arab Refo-lutions,” Ellis Goldberg  
“Mubarakism Without Mubarak: Why Egypt’s Military Will Not Embrace Democracy,” 
Azzedine Layachi “Algeria’s Rebellion by Installments”, Nicholas Pelham “Jordan’s Balancing 
Act,” Joshua Stacher “Egypt Without Mubarak,” Lisa Anderson “Demystifying the Arab Revolt: 
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According to the content of the table, national unity7
Egypt and Tunisia shared the emergence of pro democracy movement, social 
homogeneity, less in the Egyptian case, confrontation with state goals and international 
economic and political pressures for liberal reforms. The Egyptian case took more time as the ex-
elite draw a profile of legitimacy based on 1973 war and political stability supported with US 
and Israel fears from losing Mubarak alliance. Both cases reflected a will for security 
apparatus to suppress opposition that ended with delegitimization effects and increasing number 
of protesters. It accelerated the system decay
, severe coercion, the emergence of 
revolutionary movement, confrontation with state’s goals, economic structure of the state (rentier 
and non rentier states), autonomy of the military and cracks in incumbent elite’s structure explain 
differences among those countries and why some of them sustained whilst others fall down or in 
their way.  
8
Bahrain is the best case to reflect the role of national unity, regional and strategic 
competition, and economic structure of the state (rentier)
. The interference of the military has been the 
major determinate for taking a successful path. In Tunisia, the military enjoys autonomy and 
remained out of the political scene for decades. In the Egyptian case, the military enjoys popular 
support and has high level of coherence.  The future of both states is still unclear. The protest 
movement in Tunisia witnesses security restrictions in the last few days, compared with the 
Egyptian one that is still lively enough to push for more reforms. Both states achieved number of 
reforms, but without fulfilling all democratic requirements yet.  
9
                                                             
7 It should be noted that identity conflicts are used for political reasons (According to Arab 
Human Rights Report: 2009). This became so clear through how Mubark, Qadafi, Abdullah 
Salih defended themselves by preventing civil war, and preserving stability. Conflict between 
Shi’a and Sunni Mulslims was used in the Bahraini case to de legitimize demonstrations, and 
undermine Sunni and Arabs’ support for their cause. In Syria the Alawi minority is in charge of 
most important positions in the state especially the military, thus there are fears from civil war. 
. Regional and international 
8 The civil and peaceful character of demonstrations made the use of violence costly, and put 
regimes in embarrassing situations. This also attracted more regional and international support 
for protesters’ cause who asked for freedom and socioeconomic justice. 
9  Bahrain is an example to validate the argument that the more well off the country is, the more 
democratic it will be. Rentier states  are doing well like European countries in terms of per capita 
income, but the level of human development is worse than that, and resources are unjustly 
distributed. The problem is not in the availability of resources but rather the economic structure 
of rentier states and distribution of resources that undermines accountability and strength the 
central authority of the state (Diamond: 2010). This kind of states is characterized by intrusion 
and penetration.  The rationale here is no representation without taxation, rather than no taxation 
without representation. The state’s authority is not limited to taxation, but rather it is an active 
economic actor. Penetration is not only through formal institutions but through informal 
penetrative tools such as marriage, business partnerships, and monopoly over economic activities 
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interests are also expressed in the Jordanian case, where the international system is not ready to 
lose another friend after Mubark, though it would be reductionism to focus only on this factor. 
The same issue was present in the Egyptian case, but a totally different narrative emerged. The 
socioeconomic and demographic structure of Jordan is unique, and large majority of population, 
mainly Palestinians, has mutual interests with the regime. Both cases have monarchial 
traditions that put restrictions on calls for reform10
Regional and geopolitical dimensions have been significant in the Yemeni case where the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is trying to assure a gradual transformation of power, and keep 
a hand in the coming stage.  This regional interference allowed the system to sustain till now, as 
Saudi Arabia will not accept a democratic system with shi’e representation on its borders. 
Division inside the military is more crucial in the Yemeni case. It puts pressures on Abd ullah 
Saleh to not brutally suppress revolts, and it undermines its political legitimacy at the regional 
and international level.   
, but did not prevent the emergence of 
revolts. Tunisia, Egypt, Syria have different political structure, but they witnessed strong 
uprisings. In this sense, the political structure of the regime cannot be a satisfactory variable to 
understand why revolts emerged in some countries and not in others. Yemen in which there is a 
parliamentary significant representation for opposition parties like Algeria (using proportional 
representation system), witnessed revolts whilst the latter not. 
Syria and Libya are two models to question the theory of Eva Bellin about the role of 
security apparatus. For Bellin authoritarianism is based on the will and capacity of security 
apparatus to suppress opposition. In Syria and Libya the will and capacity are so prevalent, but 
they are stabilizing the regime. Severe violence led to contrary results. In Libya it ended with 
foreign intervention, and the Syrian case might be in its way. Also, violence resulted in conflicts 
inside the structure of security apparatus and undermined its coherence.  
People would successfully topple their regimes if severe suppression is associated with 
divisions and conflicts inside incumbent elite, and military structure. This is obvious in the 
Libyan case, but the Syrian regime is still able to maintain strong control over the military11
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Okruhlik: 1999).  But unlike Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, Qadafi did not create strong network of 
patronage. He resorted mainly to physical repression. Oil revenues did not preserve both regimes 
them from strong popular revolts (Gause: 2011). 
.  
10 According to Ellen Lust, monarchies managed to stay away from the pressures of opposition 
through parliamentary representation and division among opposition elite’s structure (Lust Okar: 
2004).  
11 Gause asserts that literature on Arab authoritarianism elides the changing relation between the 
military institution and ruling parties. Scholars assume that militaries are identical to their 
government; thus, they underestimated their political role, or kept it unsystematically searched. 
Based on current revolutionary patterns, Gause develops a preliminarily hypothesis about 
16 
 
Algeria has a completely different narrative. No demonstrations and no strong opposition. 
The history of civil war is still a determinate factor. The military is not controlled but rather 
running the state with civil façade12
The foregoing analysis highlights the fallacy of Eric wolf about the role of capitalism in 
pushing for revolutions, and it also undermines the significance of state’s economic structure. 
The Syrian regime has very closed socialist economic system, and grievances in Bahrain and 
Libya were never economic. Nonetheless, Wolf’s analysis would be valid in the other cases like 
Tunisia and Egypt.  
.  
Pro democracy movement is prevalent in all cases except Algeria, and with moderate 
voice in Jordan and Syria where protesters used to ask for freedom till the system employed 
harsh coercive measures13
The solidarity of the elite, national unity, control over armed forces, and geopolitical 
calculations are key factors to understand and explain differences among these cases. 
Corruption, coercion, weak opposition are all shared factors and still play a role but not as the 
preceding ones. The economic and political structures of the state are not determinant factors; 
uprisings erupted in Bahrain, and Libya as well as Syria, and Egypt despite their political and 
economic distinctions.  
.  New strategies of popular mobilization outside state’s control, 
economic and political structure, and outside traditional opposition’s structure existed (Gause: 
2011). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
political reactions of military institution. In his words: “a) militaries whose officer corps share a 
minority status with the ruling elite will stand by the regimes in times of trouble (Saddam’s Iraq, 
Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia); b) militaries in uninstitutionalized regimes where personal and 
family ties determine promotion and leadership of units (Libya, Yemen) will fragment under 
pressure into loyalist units (headed by relatives of the leader) and those willing to go over to the 
opposition; and c) highly institutionalized militaries in relatively homogeneous societies are most 
likely to assume the arbiter role in political crisis, even if they are tied to the regime (Egypt, 
Tunisia)” (Gause: 2011). 
12  The Algerian system avoids pressures from opposition parties through mechanisms of 
representation, mainly proportional representation system, and cooption (Lust Okar:2004). 
13 The empirical study of Attitudes in the Arab world by Amaney Jamal, and Mark Tessler 
indicates that the Arab support for democracy is high or as high as other regions but with a 
different perception based on gradual reform and assuring stability. It also indicates few 
differences between secular and religious groups in this regard (Jamal and Tessler: 2008). 
Differences between Islamist and secular political forces became so acute in Egypt and Tunisia 
after overthrowing their ex-elites down. Relationship between both groups would determine the 
coming phase. But it should be noted the conflict between worldly and transcendental was not a 
major factor in uprisings eruption as Eisenstadt assumed. Uprisings on the contrary reflected 
unity and understanding among all groups, especially in the Egyptian case. Later one, disputes 
and disagreements emerged. 
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Empirical indicators: Do they give an explanation? 
The findings of Transformation Index on democracy status and State Fragility index 
provide some variables that can be used to understand why some countries are more vulnerable 
to witness popular uprisings than others.  I shall narrow my analysis to: Stateness, Political 
Participation, Rule of Law, Stability of Democratic institutions, and Political and Social 
Integration indicators of Transformation Index14
Country 
. For the Fragility Index, I select only the 









































Algeria 4.7 7 4.3 4.3 2 4.3 High High high 
Bahrain 4.42 7.8 2.5 4.5 2 5.3 moderate No No 
Egypt 4.8 7 3.5 4.3 2 4.3 High No high 
Jordan 4.2 7 3.8 4 2 4.3 High No moderate 
Libya 3.2 7.5 1.5 3 2 2 High No moderate 
Syria 3.23 7 2.3 2.3 2 2.7 High No high 
Tunisia 3.78 8 2.5  3.8 2 2.7 High No moderate 
Yemen 4.32 6.3 4.3 4 2 4.7 High moderate high 
Source: BTI Transformation Index data set. Retrieved from: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/en/bti/ranking/, State Fragility Index. Retrieved from: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFImatrix2009c.pdf 
The transformation index does not include information about the coherence of military, 
use of repressive measures, and level of national unity. According to given scores, there are 
almost no differences among Arab states in terms of stateness, and stability of democratic 
institutions. Libya has the lowest scores among all of them, closer to Syria and Tunisia. Libya 
and Syria which share similar scores are the main two models to employ severe violence; even 
compared to Bahrain.   Both countries have high level of security effectiveness according to the 
Fragility index. Based on these findings, we can understand why such closed autocratic systems 
with strong security apparatus tended to use severe violence; however we still cannot make a 
theoretical statement from that. Tunisia is not that much far from Syria in terms of political and 
social integration, and level of political participation. The only difference is in terms of the 
legitimacy of security forces. Geopolitical situation gives the Syrian security apparatus more 
legitimacy. This legitimacy may explain why Syrians were hesitant at early protest days to 
                                                             
14 Each of the five indicators is divided into sub elements. The structure of Democratic index 
goes as follows: Stateness: monopoly of the use of force, state identity, no interference of 
religious dogma, and basic administration. Political participation: free and fair elections, 
effective power to govern, association and assembly rights, and freedom of expression. Rule of 
law: separation of power, independent judiciary, prosecution of office abuse, civil rights.  
Stability of democratic institutions: performance of democratic institutions, commitment to 
democratic institutions.  Political and social integration: party system, interest groups, contest to 
democratic norm, associational activities. I shall refer only to the overall scale (out of 10) for 
each of the five indicators and not their sub elements.  
18 
 
directly ask for toppling the regime, but it cannot explain to us why political reactions were 
different in both cases. In the Tunisian and Syrian case the autonomy of the military is decisive 
factor that is empirically absent.   
Furthermore, Algeria and Egypt have very close scores according to the Transformation 
Index; Algeria only has higher level of political participation than Egypt. This higher level has 
been used as a way to divide opposition and avoid public mobilization against the regime. Both 
countries have fragile political, and security legitimacy. Algeria has a fragile security apparatus 
compared with Egypt that is empirically supposed to have a strong one. Based on these empirical 
evidences, Algeria would have an equal opportunity to witness popular uprisings like Egypt, 
though this did not happen. The history of two countries is a determinant factor to understand 
why Egyptians stepped their president down, whilst Algerians are still afraid to strike in streets. 
History can only be understood in a narrative, and impossible to be empirically grasped. Also, 
the role of the military, and coherence of opposition are key elements. In the Algerian case, any 
revolutionary actions would be against the military itself which is actually running the state. 
Findings of the Fragility Index about Bahrain are significant. Bahrain has better scores 
compared with all other countries. But the legitimacy of the state and its effective security 
apparatus were not determinant factors to suppress demonstrations, the level of national unity 
and regional competition between Iran and Gulf countries were more significant. The same 
rationale can be applied to Jordan. 
Yemen has a high level of state fragility; nonetheless the system is not falling down yet. 
Regional interests and coherence of Yemeni armed forces are not empirically tested. 
So, a narrowed quantitative reading to data set would not lead to sufficient explanations 
for Arab Spring Uprisings. Geopolitical conditions, coherence of opposition, autonomy of the 
military15
In conclusion, the question that remains unanswered is would current uprisings lead to 
democracy or just reproducing new democratic façade?  Actually, the future of Yemen, Syria and 
Libya is still unclear. Bahrain and Jordan succeeded in suppressing uprisings, but no one can be 
sure about the future. The prospect of Egypt depends on the role of the military in the coming 
stage, restraining sectarian tensions, establishing strong political parties, and reforming state 
institutions. Tunisia’s prospect depends on developing an understanding between secular and 
, and solidarity of ruling elites are all significant elements that are not empirically 
tested. This should not undermine the significance of empirical analysis, but current uprisings 
proved others variables should be systematically searched.   
                                                             
15 Richard Snyder illustrates the significant role of the military in determining revolutionary or 
non revolutionary outcomes. He also emphasizes that more systematic data on the autonomy of 




religious groups, and putting more pressures for reform16
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